π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in toolExists#57
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in toolExists#57
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Replaced the vulnerable string-interpolated shell wrapper execution (`shell("/usr/bin/which \(tool)")`) with a secure, direct invocation of the `/usr/bin/which` binary using `Foundation.Process`, passing the `tool` variable strictly via the `arguments` array. Assigned `FileHandle.nullDevice` to output pipes to avoid unnecessary allocations.
Co-authored-by: acebytes <2820910+acebytes@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Command injection vulnerability identified in
toolExistswithinCacheCategory.swift. The method utilized a shell wrapper (/bin/bash -c) with string interpolation to pass dynamic arguments:shell("/usr/bin/which \(tool)").π― Impact: While the current usage of
toolExistsrelies on internal strings, the pattern itself is unsafe. If any user-controlled input or dynamically generated path containing shell metacharacters were passed to this function in the future, it would allow arbitrary command execution on the host machine.π§ Fix: Replaced the vulnerable
shell(...)wrapper with a secure direct invocation of/usr/bin/whichusingFoundation.Process. Thetoolstring is now passed safely through theprocess.argumentsarray, neutralizing the injection risk entirely. Additionally, implementedFileHandle.nullDevicefor standard streams to prevent unnecessary pipe allocations.β Verification: Tested locally. The function still correctly identifies if a tool exists on the system while safely handling inputs containing spaces or metacharacters.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 17173991696500172285 started by @acebytes